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Abstract: Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are currently used in many application areas including 
military applications, health related applications, control and tracking applications and environment 
and habitat monitoring applications. The harsh and unattended deployment of these networks along 
with their resource restrictions makes their security issue very important. Prevention-based security 
approaches like cryptography, authentication and key management have been used to protect WSNs 
from different kinds of attacks but these approaches are not enough to protect the network from 
insider attacks that may extract sensitive information even in the presence of the prevention-based 
solution. Detection-based approaches are then proposed to protect WSNs from insider attacks and 
act as a second line defense after the failure of the prevention-based approaches. Many intrusion 
detection schemes have been introduced for WSN in the literature. In this article, we present a 
survey of intrusion detection schemes in WSNs. First, we present the similar works and show their 
differences from this work. After that, we outline the fundamentals of intrusion detection in WSNs, 
describing the types of attacks and state the motivation for intrusion detection in WSNs. Then, we 
demonstrate the challenges of developing an ideal intrusion detection scheme for WSNs followed by 
the main requirements of a good candidate intrusion detection scheme. The state-of-the-art intrusion 
detection schemes are then presented based on the techniques used in each scheme and categorizing 
them into four main categories: rule-based, data mining and computational intelligence based, game 
theoretical based and statistical based. The analysis of each scheme in these categories is presented 
showing  their  advantages  and  drawbacks.  By  the  end  of  each  category,  we  state  the  general 
advantages and shortcomings of each category. The survey ends by recommending some important 
research opportunities in this field for future research. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
  The  fast  advancement  in  communication 
technologies  introduces  cheap,  low-power  and 
multifunctional devices which leverage the idea of the 
sensor (Akyildiz et al., 2002). Wireless Sensor Networks 
(WSNs)  can  be  defined  as  a  kind  of  networks  that  is 
formed by (ten to thousands) of tiny sensors which are 
densely  deployed  in  an  unattended  environment.  This 
network has no predefined infrastructure and can work in 
a  structured  or  non-structured  manner.  The  resource-
constrained feature plays the main rule in the ways that 
WSNs should work or deployed.  
  According to Akyildiz et al. (2002), there are some 
features that make WSNs different from other Mobile 
Ad-hoc  NETworks  (MANET).  These  differences 
include the following: 
 
·  The number of nodes in WSN is greater compared 
to MANET 
·  The great capacity of nodes in WSN compared to 
MANET 
·  The high chance of sensor failures in WSN because 
of the deployment circumstances 
·  The need for mobility causes the dynamic change 
of WSN topology 
·  The  high resource  constraints of WSN in  terms of 
power,  storage,  communication  and  processing 
capability Am. J. Applied Sci., 9 (10): 1636-1652, 2012 
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  Yick  et  al.  (2008)  categorized  the  WSN 
applications into two categories: monitoring and tracking. 
Each  category  is  further  categorized  into  many  sub 
categories. A broad number of monitoring and tracking 
systems are already implemented and in the service to the 
public or the industry. However, describing such system is 
out of the scope of this survey. 
  Based on the differences from other networks and 
because  of  the  harsh  environment  in  which  they  are 
deployed, WSN is very susceptible and vulnerable to 
many kinds of attacks either from inside or outside of 
the network. It is also clear that most of the security 
solution adopted for MANET cannot be directly used 
for WSNs for the same reasons (Akyildiz et al., 2002). 
  To  protect  WSNs  against  different  kinds  of 
vulnerabilities,  preventive  mechanisms  like 
cryptography  and  authentication  can  be  applied  to 
prevent  some  types  of  attacks.  This  kind  of 
preventive mechanisms formed the first defense line 
for WSNs. However, some attacks like wormholes, 
sinkhole,  could  not  be  detected  using  this  kind  of 
preventive  mechanisms.  In  addition,  these 
mechanisms  are  only  effective  to  prevent  from 
outside attacks and failed to guarantee the prevention 
of  intruders  from  inside  the  network  (Silva  et  al., 
2005). Because of that, it is necessary to use some 
mechanisms of intrusion detection. 
  Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are considered 
to act as the second defense line against network attacks 
that preventive mechanisms fail to address (Silva et al., 
2005).  An  Intrusion  detection  system  is  defined  in 
(Debar  et  al.,  1999)  as  “A  system  that  dynamically 
monitors  the  events  taking  place  on  a  system  and 
decides whether these events are symptoms of an attack 
or constitute a legitimate use of the system”. However, 
there are many challenges posed against the application 
of the IDS for WSNs. These challenges are due to the 
lack of resources like, energy, processing and storage. 
  In general, IDS schemes are categorized into misuse 
IDS  and  anomaly  IDS.  The  former  matches  the  new 
observations with the signatures stored in the database of 
the IDS. The later detects the abnormal activities from 
the predefined normal profile in order to identify possible 
attacks.  Furthermore,  Anomaly  IDS  schemes  can  be 
classified into supervised based, semi supervised based 
and  unsupervised  based  IDS.  The  supervised  based 
intrusion  detection  schemes  involve  training  the 
detection model which requires prior knowledge about 
what is normal behavior and what is anomaly. The semi-
supervised  intrusion  detection  schemes  require  the 
knowledge of one class either the normal or the anomaly 
to help build the model for detection. The unsupervised 
intrusion  detection  schemes  do  not  require  any  prior 
knowledge to build the detection model and instead use 
some  measurements  to  decide  if  the  data  instance  is 
normal or anomalous.  
  Many  techniques  have  been  used  to  design 
intrusion  detection  schemes  for  WSN.  Rule-based 
intrusion  detection  schemes  can  be  considered  as 
supervised anomaly intrusion detection schemes where 
a set of rules are defined before the detection process 
using assumptions, information, or experience known in 
advance.  These  schemes  compare  the  attributes  of 
network  behavior  to  these  predefined  rules.  If  the 
attributes  passed  this  comparison  it  is  considered 
normal, else it is considered intrusions. Upon deciding 
of an intrusion, an alarm is raised to inform the system 
administrator to take an action.  
  Data  Mining  and  Computational  Intelligence 
(DM/CI)  techniques  are  commonly  used  to  build 
intrusion  detection  schemes  in  computer  networks. 
However,  the  use  of  these  techniques  to  build  IDS 
schemes for WSN is either in its infancy stage or not 
fulfilling the special requirements of IDS in WSN.  
  Game theory concepts are also used to design some 
intrusion detection schemes  in the  literature. In these 
schemes,  some  game  strategies  have  been  used  that 
simulate  the  intrusion  detection  process  as  a  game 
between the attacker and the intrusion detection agent. 
  Statistical  based  intrusion  detection  schemes  are 
common schemes used for general anomaly detection in 
WSN.  However,  some  researchers  used  them  for 
intrusion detection. These schemes are based on building 
of the probability distribution of the traffic data. 
  The contribution of this survey can be summarized 
in the following: 
 
·  Describes  the  fundamentals  and  challenges  of 
intrusion detection in WSN 
·  Describes  the  requirements  of  intrusion  detection 
in WSN 
·  Provides technique based taxonomy of the current 
intrusion detection schemes in WSN together with 
an  evaluation  of  their  satisfaction  of  the 
requirements 
·  Introduces some opportunities to be considered for 
the future research 
 
Existing  surveys:  The  first  comprehensive  and  most 
cited  survey  in  the  field  of  WSN  is  introduced  by 
Akyildiz  et  al.  (2002).  In  this  survey,  the  basic 
fundamentals of WSNs were explored including the 
potential uses of these networks as well as the review 
of  factors  that  affect  the  design  of  the  sensor 
networks  and  the  communication  architecture  used 
by  them.  Other  two  surveys  about  the  routing  in 
WSN  have  been  proposed  (Al-Karaki  and  Kamal, Am. J. Applied Sci., 9 (10): 1636-1652, 2012 
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2004; Akkaya and Younis, 2005) however, they did 
not discuss the security issues. 
  Karlof and Wanger (2003) introduced an analysis 
of the security issues for routing in sensor  networks. 
They  described  many  kinds  of  attacks  on  sensor 
networks and suggest the suitable countermeasures that 
can  help  to  mitigate  them.  Many  surveys  have  been 
proposed for the security in WSN in general (Yun et al., 
2008; Chen et al., 2009; Christin et al., 2010; Walters et 
al.,  2007);  however,  all  of  them  discussed  only  the 
prevention based schemes as well as the secure routing 
protocols.  These  solutions  focused  on  protecting  the 
network from the outsider attacks and ignore the insider 
intrusions and compromised nodes. 
  The  first  survey  about  the  anomaly  detection  in 
WSN was introduced by Rajasegarar et al. (2008). In 
this survey, the authors introduced the state of the art 
techniques  for  anomaly  detection  in  WSN  and 
described  their  characteristics  that  differ  from  the 
anomaly  detection  techniques  in  traditional  networks. 
Anomaly detection techniques in the mentioned survey 
have been classified into statistical techniques and non-
parametric  techniques.  The  rule-based  schemes  have 
been introduced as non-parametric schemes. 
  Outlier  detection  in  wireless  sensor  networks 
survey  introduced  by  Yang  et  al.  (2010)  is  a  very 
systematic  and  technical  survey  describes  the  outlier 
detection  techniques  used  in  WSN.  It  explores  the 
challenges  of  designing  effective  outlier  detection 
techniques as to motivate researchers to find solutions 
for such challenges. The most exciting contribution in 
this survey is the technique based taxonomy of outlier 
detection techniques based on three main criteria named 
the nature of sensed data, type of outlier and the degree 
of outlier. This classification is very useful for choosing 
the  suitable  technique  based  on  the  context  of 
application and its criteria. 
  The  most  recent  survey  introduced  by  Xie  et  al. 
(2011)  for  anomaly  detection  techniques  in  WSN 
classified  the  detection  techniques  based  on  the 
architecture of WSN into flat based and hierarchical based 
techniques. Then, the anomaly  detection  methods  were 
described for each structure. They concluded their survey 
by analyzing the performance of the reviewed techniques 
based  on  some  performance  metrics  and  show  the 
possible research directions in future anomaly detection. 
  Although,  the  surveys  (Rajasegarar  et  al.,  2008; 
Yang et al., 2010; Xie et al., 2011) provide a systematic 
and  comprehensive  description  of  the  anomaly 
detection techniques used in WSN, they only approach 
the problem of anomaly detection from the perspective 
of  anomaly  in  general.  Attacks  or  intrusions  are 
considered to be a kind of anomalies because it affects 
the normal behavior of the system. The only survey that 
is available at the moment, according to the best of our 
knowledge  in  intrusion  detection,  is  introduced  by 
Farooqi and Khan (2009). However, this survey is not 
comprehensive and it does not show the weaknesses of 
the schemes as well as the directions for future research.  
  From this point,  we start  to make this  survey as 
much  as  specialized  and  comprehensive  on  intrusion 
detection  schemes  for  WSN.  The  main  difference 
between this survey and the published surveys is that, 
the published surveys targeted the anomaly detection in 
general  whereas  this  survey  is  very  specific  for  the 
intrusion  detection  in  WSN.  The  intrusion  detection 
should  be  performed  in  real  time  but  the  anomaly 
detection  could  be  performed  after  a  predefined 
threshold of time. 
 
Fundamentals  of  intrusion  detection  in  WSN:  We 
introduce the fundamentals of the intrusion detection in 
WSN,  which  includes  the  definition  of  the  intrusion, 
types of intrusions/attacks in WSNs, the motivation and 
need  for  intrusion  detection  and  the  challenges  of 
developing a good candidate intrusion detection scheme 
for WSN. 
 
The definition of the Intrusion/Attack: Heady (1990) 
defines  the  intrusion  as  any  set  of  actions  that  are 
attempting to compromise the main components of the 
security  system:  the  integrity,  confidentiality  or 
availability of a resource. In the same work, the intruder 
therefore  was  defined  as  an  individual  or  group  of 
individuals  who  take  the  action  in  the  intrusion. 
Zamboni  (2001)  adds  the  statement  of  success  or 
failures of these actions so it also refers to the attacks 
against the computer system. 
  In  the  theme  of  wireless  sensor  network,  the 
concept stills the same since the intrusion also target 
any of the components mentioned above. The nature of 
WSNs  and  its  special  characteristics  like  the  harsh 
deployment,  energy  constraints  and  the  media  of 
communication  makes  them  very  susceptible  to  the 
intrusions more than other networks.  
 
Types  of  attacks  in  WSN:  Shi  and  Perrig  (2006) 
categorized the attacks on  sensor networks into three 
main categories: 
 
Outsider  versus  insider  attacks:  based  on  the  node 
that  is  launching  the  attack,  if  it  belonging  to  the 
network so it is considered as insider attack, otherwise 
it is considered as outsider attack. 
 
Passive versus active attacks: based on the impact that 
results from an attack. Passive attacks just monitor or 
eavesdrop  on  the  data  packets,  whereas  the  active 
attacks  do  modify  the  data  streams  or  reported  false 
alarms to the base station. Am. J. Applied Sci., 9 (10): 1636-1652, 2012 
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Mote-class  versus  laptop-class  attacks:  based  on  the 
capability of the attacker in compromising the network. 
In  mote-class  attacks,  a  few  nodes  with  a  similar 
capability  to  the  network  nodes  are  used  as  attackers, 
whereas in laptop-class, an attacker uses powerful devices 
like  laptops  with  higher  transmission  range,  processing 
power and energy to compromise the network. 
  According to the security requirements needed for 
WSN, another classification of attacks is introduced in 
(Shi and Perrig, 2006) as the following: 
 
·  Attacks on secrecy and authentication: the standard 
protection  against  this  category  is  by  using  the 
standard cryptographic techniques 
·  Attacks on network availability: usually referred as 
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. This type could 
target any layer of the network 
·  Attacks against service integrity: known as stealthy 
attacks  that  can  fool  the  network  and  make  it 
accept false data streams by compromising a node 
and inject false data through it 
 
  Wang et al. (2006) used the classification work of 
(Shi and Perrig, 2006) and go further in classifying the 
DoS attacks that could target each layer of the WSN. A 
summary of the Wang et al. (2006) classification is in 
the following Table 1. 
 
The  motivation  for  Intrusion  Detection  in  WSN: 
Generally,  the  deployment  of  WSN  in  an  unattended 
environment  and  the  use  of  wireless  signals  as  the 
media for communication make it easy for eavesdroppers 
to  get  the  signals.  Moreover,  the  limitations  in 
processing, storage and battery lifetime make the security 
issues  of  these  networks  difficult.  Different  types  of 
attacks against WSN have been explored in the literature 
like, attacks on sensed data, selective forwarding attacks, 
sinkhole  attacks,  hello  flood  attack  and  many  more 
(Karlof and Wagner, 2003). 
 
Table 1:  Taxonomy of attacks according to WSN layers (Al-Karaki 
and Kamal, 2004) 
Physical layer attacks  Jamming attacks 
  Tampering attacks 
Data link layer attacks  Collision attacks 
  Exhaustion attacks 
  Unfairness attacks 
Network layer attacks  Spoofed/alter routing information 
  Selective forwarding 
  Sinkhole attacks 
  Sybil attacks 
  Wormhole attacks 
  Hello flood attacks 
  Acknowledgment spoofing attacks 
Transport layer attacks  Flooding attacks 
  Desynchronization attacks 
  Furthermore,  the  fact  that  WSN  is  composed  of 
numerous cheap and tiny devices and usually used in an 
open  or  harsh  area,  make  them  very  vulnerable  to 
different  types  of  attacks  (Rajasegarar  et  al.,  2008; 
Wang  et  al.,  2006).  For  example,  the  security  of  the 
WSN  applied  to  the  battlefield  is  very  critical  if  the 
sensor nodes are invaded by the enemy. 
  All the proposed security solutions in the literature 
can be grouped into two main mechanisms: preventive-
based  and  detection-based  mechanisms.  Preventive-
based mechanisms, i.e., encryption and authentication, 
can be considered as the first level of defense against 
security  breaches  and  can  protect  the  network  from 
outside known compromises. Some of these preventive 
based  mechanisms  even  fail  to  prevent  from  some 
outsider  attacks  and  cannot  prevent  from  the  insider 
attacks that is caused by some compromised nodes from 
the inside of the network itself (Silva et al., 2005). For 
those  reasons,  detection-based  mechanisms  are  used 
after  the  preventive  mechanisms  fail  to  isolate  the 
attacks  and  hence  considered  as  the  second  level  of 
defense.  The  detection  based  mechanisms  help  to 
protect the network from insider attacks as well as from 
the undetected outsider attacks.  
 
The  taxonomy  framework  of  intrusion  detection 
schemes used in WSN: The straightforward method to 
detect attacks in WSN is to build a profile of normal 
pattern behavior of the data and then use this profile to 
detect  attacks.  The  new  observed  patterns  whose 
characteristics  are  significantly  different  from  the 
normal  profile  indicate  a  possible  kind  of  attack. 
According to the prior knowledge available for attack 
detection,  these  schemes  can  be  classified  into  three 
main  basic  categories:  supervised  learning  based, 
unsupervised  learning  based  and  semi-supervised 
learning based schemes (Tan, 2007).  
 
Supervised learning based schemes: involves training 
or any kind of prior knowledge in order to build the 
normal profile during the training phase. In the testing 
phase, the new patterns will be compared with the build 
normal profile to detect any deviation. The rule-based 
intrusion detection schemes can be considered in this 
category since they are depending on a prior knowledge 
in the form of predefined rules. Their dependency on 
rules  gives  them  an  advantage  over  training  based 
techniques; however, they  have  many drawbacks that 
will be discussed later in this review. 
 
Semi-supervised based schemes: in this category, the 
training data has labeled instances of one class which is 
the normal class.  Am. J. Applied Sci., 9 (10): 1636-1652, 2012 
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  This  feature  gives  them  an  advantage  over 
supervised techniques and make them suitable for some 
kinds  of  applications  that  has  an  available  one  class 
data (Chandola et al., 2009). According to the best of 
our knowledge, we cannot find any scheme based on 
this  category  for  intrusion  detection  in  WSN  and 
instead we found some schemes designed for general 
anomaly/outlier  detection  like  the  one-class  SVM 
scheme used for anomaly detection (Rajasegarar et al., 
2007; Zhang et al., 2009). 
 
Unsupervised  based  schemes:  in  these  schemes, 
techniques do not require training data and instead of 
that they make some assumptions that normal behavior 
is far different from the anomaly. Their problem, if this 
assumption is not always true, it will suffer from high 
false  alarms.  The  measure  used  for  calculating  the 
deviation from normal behavior in these schemes like: 
distance measures are very computationally complex 
and  hence  not  always  suitable  for  the  restricted 
resources  WSN.  Some  clustering  based  and  data 
mining  approaches  are  proposed  for  the  intrusion 
detection  in  WSN  (Baig,  2011;  Kaplantzis  et  al., 
2007;  Loo  et  al.,  2006)  and  many  more  will  be 
described later in this review. 
 
The challenges of designing an IDS for WSN: There 
are many challenges that make the development of an 
ideal intrusion detection scheme for WSN non trivial. In 
the following, we state the main challenges that should 
be considered when designing ideal IDS for WSN. 
 
Resource constraints: Usually, in classical networks, 
the  IDSs  are  installed  on  powerful  computers  like 
mainframes  on  which  they  can  operate  efficiently. 
However, in WSN this is not possible because of the 
resource constrained sensors in terms of computation, 
memory  and  power  consumption.  Since  WSN  is 
composed  of  numerous  number  of  tiny  and  cheap 
sensors  and  these  sensors  has  very  limited  power, 
limited  storage  capacity,  limited  memory,  limited 
power  processing  capability  and  limited  signal 
bandwidth,  it  makes  it  very  difficult  to  design  an 
effective intrusion detection system. 
 
Dynamic topology change: the continuous change in 
topology  because  of  the  movement  of  the  sensor  in 
some WSN applications makes it difficult for the IDS 
to cope with this dynamic change. 
 
Continuous  data  streaming:  huge  amounts  of  data 
streaming  results  in  the  need  for  an  online  intrusion 
detection system to cater to this kind of data. In some 
applications, the online detection of intrusions is very 
critical and cannot be postponed. 
Different types of routing protocols: different types 
of routing protocols are used to meet the requirements 
of different types of WSN applications. Therefore, the 
design  of  intrusion  detection  scheme  for  one  kind  of 
routing  protocols  could  not  be  fit  easily  for  other 
protocol and result in a very specific detection scheme.  
 
Difficulty in building intelligent IDS models: because 
of  the  lack  of  the  labeled  dataset  that  contains  both 
normal  profiles  and  attacks,  the  use  of  artificial 
intelligence techniques that requires training is difficult 
if not impossible. 
 
Lack  of  standards:  According  to  the  best  of  our 
knowledge, there is no intrusion detection model specific 
for WSN like other types of networks. The existence of 
such model will ease the process of standardization and 
make  the  evaluation  of  any  proposed  IDS  scheme 
feasible compared to other schemes. 
 
The  requirements  of  intrusion  detection  in  WSN: 
After clarifying the main challenges for designing any 
IDS  for  WSN,  we  are  ready  to  set  up  the  basic 
requirements that should be taken during the design of 
any scheme for intrusion detection in WSN. From the 
literature, we found that, some important requirements 
should be taken carefully during any design for a good 
IDS scheme as the following:  
 
·  Generality: since most of the proposed schemes are 
very specific, we need such general schemes that 
can detect as many attacks as possible 
·  Independent of prior knowledge: since the labeled 
data is not available and the collection of such data 
and classifying it into normal and attacks is non-
trivial task 
·  Distribution: because the collection of the audit is 
distributive as well as the analysis together with the 
collaboration between the nodes, the implementation 
of the IDS agent should also be distributed to avoid 
the communication overhead caused by exchanging 
the information between the nodes 
·  Fast  detection:  to  cope  with  the  continuous 
streaming of data in some WSN applications 
·  High  detection  accuracy:  this  feature  is  a  key 
characteristic of any IDS for any kind of networks 
 
  In addition, according to Krontiris (2008) the good 
IDS  solution  should  fulfill  some  requirements  that 
include the following: 
 
·  Localize  auditing:  since  there  is  no  centralized 
point  for  collecting  audit  data  far  from  the  base 
station in WSN, the proposed IDS should rely on 
the locality of collecting data in each sensor node. Am. J. Applied Sci., 9 (10): 1636-1652, 2012 
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The partially collection of data will introduce the 
challenge of increasing the false alarms 
·  Minimizing  the  use  of  the  constrained  resources: 
the scarcity of resources in these networks make it 
difficult  to  design  a  lightweight  and  at  the  same 
time  efficient  IDS.  The  limited  power,  memory, 
processing capability and limited bandwidth should 
be considered before developing the model 
·  Ensuring the availability of services and resources 
all the time: this means if some of the nodes are 
compromised this should not stop the function of 
the network. The network should still provide its 
services to the interested parties 
·  Fault tolerance even in the presence of the attack: 
the IDS should ensure the tolerability and recover 
from being attacked 
·  Ensuring the real time response for any kind of 
attacks:  because  there  is  a  huge  streaming  of 
data over the time, a suitable real time solution 
is required 
·  Supporting scalability: because some of the nodes 
get  damage  and  some  others  are  needed  to  be 
added from time to time 
 
Rule-based intrusion detection schemes in WSN: Also 
called specification based intrusion detection schemes. In 
these schemes, the detection rules are first designed by 
domain expert before the starting the detection process. 
Most  of  the  techniques  in  these  schemes  follow  three 
main  phases:  data  acquisition  phase,  rule  application 
phase and intrusion detection phase (Silva et al., 2005). 
In the following sub-sections, the key important schemes 
in this category are explored. 
 
Decentralized  IDS  in  WSN:  Silva  et  al.  (2005) 
propose the first and the most cited rule-based intrusion 
detection  scheme  for  WSN  to  detect  many  different 
kinds of attacks in different layers. In this scheme, there 
are three main phases involved: data acquisition phase 
in  which  the  monitor  nodes  are  responsible  of 
promiscuous listening of the messages and filtering the 
important  information  for  the  analysis;  the  rule 
application  phase,  in  which  the  pre-defined  rules  are 
applied to the stored data from the previous phase, if 
the  message  analysis  failed  any  of  the  rules  test,  a 
failure is raised and the counter increased by one; the 
intrusion detection phase, a comparison is taken place 
between the number of raised failures produced from 
the rule application phase with a predefined number of 
occasional failures that may happen in the network. If 
the  total  number  of  the  raised  failures  is  higher, 
intrusion alarm is produced. 
  According to Xie et al. (2011), this scheme brings 
a good framework to the class of rule-based intrusion 
detection. But, there is an important drawback of this 
scheme,  which  is  the  ambiguity  in  determining  the 
number of monitoring nodes dedicated to the detection 
process, the way of choosing them and how to make 
sure  that  the  way  of  selection  will  cover  the  entire 
network. In addition, this scheme is restricted to some 
types of attacks and the question which may rise up is 
what  if  new  types  of  attacks  emerge?  All  these 
drawbacks  should  be  considered  when  designing  any 
kind of intrusion detection scheme. 
 
Malicious node detection in WSN: Pires et al. (2004) 
present  a  solution  to  identify  the  possible  malicious 
node based on the received signal strength measured in 
each node. They  showed how to detect two  kinds of 
attacks called HELLO flood attack and the wormhole 
attack  in  WSN  by  building  a  rule  that  compare  the 
energy  of  the  received  signal  and  the  energy  of  the 
same  observed  signal  around  the  network.  Although, 
this  solution  was  one  of  the  first  solutions  in  the 
domain, it still restricted to those two types of attacks. 
In  addition,  sometimes  there  are  other  reasons  rather 
than  attacks  that  may  cause  a  change  in  the  signal 
strength which make this solution impractical. 
 
An  intrusion  detection  system  for  wireless  sensor 
network: A novel intrusion detection scheme that takes 
the benefits of neighboring node information to detect 
the node impersonation and resource depletion attacks 
has  been  proposed  by  Onat  and  Miri  (2005).  In  this 
scheme each node can make a statistical profile of its 
neighbor’s behavior based on two features which are 
the received power rate and the arrival packet rate. 
This scheme cannot to be generalized for a typical 
wireless sensor network application in which  many 
types of attacks evolve continuously. In addition and 
similar to the scheme proposed in (Pires et al., 2004), 
the building of the rules based on the received power 
rate is impractical since there are other factors that 
may affect this feature. 
 
Towards intrusion detection in WSN: Krontiris et al. 
(2007)  introduce  a  lightweight  scheme  for  detecting 
selective  forwarding  and  blackhole  attacks  in  WSN. 
The key idea of their scheme is to make nodes monitor 
their  neighborhood  and  then  communicate  between 
each other to decide if there is an intrusion taken place. 
The  scheme  is  further  evaluated  experimentally  on  a 
real WSN deployment. 
  This  scheme  benefits  from  the  neighbors 
monitoring so that there is a kind of distribution that 
will  minimize  the  computation  load  on  a  detection 
agent node. However, there will be an increase in the 
communication messages between nodes during the Am. J. Applied Sci., 9 (10): 1636-1652, 2012 
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collaboration  for  voting  that  will  increase  the 
communication overhead and as a result will deplete 
the  power  of  nodes  quickly.  It  is  clear  that,  this 
scheme lacks the generality that other schemes in the 
same category. 
 
Intrusion  detection  scheme  of  sinkhole  attack  in 
WSN:  More  specific  intrusion  detection  scheme  to 
detect sinkhole attack was proposed by Krontiris et al. 
(2008).  This  scheme  is  composed  of  four  modules: 
Local  Packet  Monitoring  Module,  Local  Detection 
Engine  Module,  Cooperative  Detection  Engine  and 
Local Response Model. The proposed scheme has been 
implemented  in  the  TinyOS  environment  with 
MinRoute  protocol.  A  suitable  detection  rules  have 
been prepared to suite with the sinkhole attack. 
  Generally,  this  scheme  satisfies  the  distribution 
feature of IDS which is highly required on a large scale 
and autonomous environment like WSN. The problem 
here still with the communication overhead between the 
nodes  to  exchange  useful  information  that  helps  in 
detecting the attack.  
 
Neighbor-based  intrusion  detection  for  WSN: 
Stetsko  et  al. (2010)  present  an  intrusion detection 
architecture  based  on  collaboration  between 
neighbors. They evaluated their scheme for detecting 
three  types  of  attacks:  Hello  flood,  selective 
forwarding and jamming attacks. Their scheme was 
implemented for Collaboration Tree Protocol (CTP) 
on the TinyOS environment.  
  Although,  the  collaboration  among  nodes  makes 
this  scheme strong, the communication overhead is a 
problem. In addition, the extracted features that are 
used to construct the rules like packet sending rate 
and packet dropping rate caused a high false alarm 
for detecting attacks. Another drawback of this study 
is that it did not consider the power consumption rate 
related  to  the  performance  which  is  a  very  critical 
issue in WSNs. 
 
A  new  collaborative  approach  for  IDS  on  WSN: 
Recently,  a  collaborative  IDS  scheme  has  been 
proposed  by  Lemos  et  al.  (2010)  to  detect  node 
repetition  attacks.  This  scheme  is  based  on 
determining  some  nodes  to  be  monitored  nodes  for 
monitoring the behavior of other nodes in the network 
based on satisfying set of predefined rules suitable for 
a specific attack type. These monitor nodes are in turn 
monitored  by  special  nodes  called  supervisor  nodes 
which  are  responsible  for  correlating  the  evidences 
resulted by monitor nodes. 
  Although,  this  scheme  seems  robust  in 
protecting  the  network  by  using  two  layers  of 
protection, there are some drawbacks that limit the 
usefulness  of  this  scheme.  To  begin  with,  the 
supervisor nodes could be sources of failure if they 
have  been  compromised.  Another  drawback  is 
related to the generality which is a major problem for 
the most rule-based schemes for intrusion detection. 
Many assumptions have been made for designing this 
scheme which caused inflexibility of application. 
 
Fuzzy logic intrusion detection scheme for directed 
diffusion based sensor networks: Chi and Cho (2006) 
propose an intrusion detection scheme based on fuzzy 
logic.  Some  features  of  the  traffic  were  extracted  to 
build  the  fuzzy  rules  which  are:  node  energy  level, 
message transmission rate, neighbor nodes list and error 
rate in the transmission. The scheme was constructed to 
prevent  and  detect  from  the  denial  of  service  (DoS) 
attack which always drains the resources of the system. 
The  base  station  or  some  monitoring  nodes  will  be 
responsible  for  collecting  the  information  messages 
from the neighborhood and the detection value will be 
calculated  by  the  fuzzy  controller  based  on  the  four 
features mentioned above 
  It is not clear how to choose the monitor nodes and 
how many nodes will be enough to protect the network. 
In  addition,  the  need  for  an  expert  or  sufficient 
experience to prepare the rule causes unadaptability of 
the  scheme  to  detect  new  emerging  attacks.  Another 
drawback is that the chosen monitor node can be a point 
of failure if it is being compromised itself. 
 
Fuzzy  logic  intrusion  detection  scheme  against 
sinkhole attacks in directed diffusion based sensor 
networks:  Another  fuzzy  logic  based  intrusion 
detection  approach  has  been  proposed  by  Moon  and 
Cho  (2009)  to  detect  sinkhole  attacks  in  directed 
diffusion based sensor networks. Two features related 
to the directed diffusion protocols are used which are 
the  reinforcement  ratio  and  the  radius.  The 
reinforcement  ratio  is  the  proportion  of  the 
reinforcement  messages  transmitted  in  an  area  to  the 
number of sensing events from the nodes. The radius is 
defined as the number of hop counts between any two 
nodes in the area. In the case of the sinkhole attack, 
there will be more reinforcement message traffic in area 
than the normal number and the number of hop count 
will  be  smaller.  The  fuzzy  logic  controller  will  use 
these  two  features  as  an  input  to  generate  its  output 
which  is  the  detection  value.  If  the  result  detection 
value is greater than a predefined security threshold, the Am. J. Applied Sci., 9 (10): 1636-1652, 2012 
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controller will raise an alarm that a sinkhole attack has 
taken place in the area. Prior to the calculation of the 
detection  value,  the  fuzzy  rules  should  be  set  by  an 
expert  according  to  the  symptoms  of  the  sinkhole 
attacks. 
  Using fuzzy logic gives the flexibility of detection 
sinkhole attacks since the input values are not always 
sharp values. However, the main problem of any fuzzy 
based scheme is the need for manual setting of rules.  
 
Intrusion  Detection  based  on  Traffic  Analysis  and 
Fuzzy Inference System in WSN: Ponomarchuk and 
Seo  (2010)  introduced  an  intrusion  detection  scheme 
for  WSN  by  utilizing  two  main  traffic  features:  the 
packet reception rate and the packet inter-arrival time in 
a time window and then applies the fuzzy inference to 
decide  whether  an  attack  has  taken  place  or  not. 
However,  this  scheme  is  based  on  fuzzy  logic,  so  it 
needs  the  rules  to  be  prepared  prior  the  detection 
process. The dependence on the prior knowledge which 
is  the  rules  makes  such  schemes  impractical  for  a 
continuous  streaming  environment  like  WSN.  In 
addition, the authors did not specify certain attacks to 
be detected by this scheme. 
  Advantages  of  Rule-based  intrusion  detection 
schemes for WSN: 
 
·  Fast  detection:  because  there  is  no  training 
involved in these schemes. This feature fulfills the 
need  for  online  detection  when  there  is  a 
continuous  streaming  of  data  in  some  WSN 
applications 
·  The  computational  complexity  is  not  discussed 
here: since the schemes use only simple rules for 
detecting attacks 
·  Higher  detection  accuracy:  since  it  depends  on 
comparison with some predefined rules,  
 
  Shortcomings  of  Rule-based  intrusion  detection 
schemes for WSN: 
 
·  Detection generality: since these schemes depend 
on the rules prepared by experts for specific attack 
types, it cannot be generalized to detect other types 
of attacks because different attacks have different 
symptoms (features) that will derive different rules 
·  Collaborative voting: most of the schemes based on 
collaboration  between  the  neighbors  that  vote  to 
decide  about  the  occurrence  of  an  attack.  This 
voting  mechanism  may  increase  the 
communication overhead 
·  Assumptions:  most  of  the  schemes  put  many 
assumptions prior to the building of their detection 
agent. These assumptions make their applicability 
difficult for different applications 
·  The absence of standardized evaluation metrics: it 
is  obvious  that  most  of  schemes  use  different 
metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of the scheme 
 
  In the following Table 2 we summarize the rule-
based techniques analyzed above and show the attacks 
that  are  targeted  and  the  performance  evaluation 
metrics used to evaluate them.  
  From the above Table 2, we can see that most of 
schemes are targeted for detecting specific attacks. We 
can also see that different evaluation measures used by 
different  schemes  which  imply  the  absence  of  the 
standards  of  evaluation  metrics.  Computational 
complexity  is  not  important  to  be  evaluated  in  these 
schemes because; these schemes are very simple and do 
not  need  high  computational  capabilities  since  they 
only compare with very simple predefined rules. 
 
Data  mining  and  computational  intelligence  based 
schemes: Data mining and Computational Intelligence 
(DM/CI)  techniques  have  been  used  extensively  in 
building  intelligent  intrusion  detection  schemes  in 
computer  networks  because  of  their  ability  to  detect 
unknown  attacks  that  the  traditional  signature  based 
schemes  fail  to  detect.  In  WSN,  the  use  of  DM/CI 
techniques for building IDS schemes still in early stages 
because of the difficulty of employing such techniques 
on  the  limited  resources.  The  following  sub-sections 
survey  the  DM/CI  based  intrusion  detection  schemes 
used to detect attacks in WSN. 
 
Clustering-based  Intrusion  detection  for  routing 
attacks  in  WSN:  Loo  et  al.  (2006)  propose  a  data 
mining-based  intrusion  detection  scheme  for  WSN.  In 
this scheme, each node uses the fixed width clustering 
algorithm  to  build  the  normal  profile  from  the  node 
traffic  behavior.  This  normal  profile  is  used  later  to 
detect abnormal activities caused by attacks. The scheme 
is composed of three main stages: feature selection stage 
in which the most important features that characterize the 
network traffic have been selected; cluster formulation, 
by applying the Euclidean distance metric to measure the 
similarities between the data traffic points and then form 
the clusters; and the cluster labeling stage, in which the 
result clusters are labeled based on the assumption that 
the number of objects in the normal cluster is much more 
than that number in the anomalous one. 
  The  authors  claimed  that,  this  scheme  has  many 
advantages including, the ability of detecting unknown 
attacks since it is unsupervised. In addition, the number 
of features used to build the normal profile is suitable to 
make this scheme generic for detecting different types of 
attacks. Moreover, the fixed width clustering algorithm 
reduces the number of parameters required for clustering 
and requires only one pass through the traffic samples.Am. J. Applied Sci., 9 (10): 1636-1652, 2012 
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Table 2: summary of Rule-based schemes 
Techniques  Attacks  Performance evaluation metrics  
Silva et al. (2005)  -Negligence  -Detection Rate (DR) 
  -Exhaustion  -False Positive (FP) rate 
  -Blackhole 
  -Selective forwarding 
  -Content alteration 
  -DoS 
  -Wormhole 
  -Hello Flood 
  -Jamming 
Pires et al. (2004)  -Hello Flood  -Malicious node detection percentage 
  -Wormhole  -Malicious message detection percentage 
Onat and Miri (2005)  -Node impersonation (Sybil)  -Probability of false alarms 
  -Power depletion (DoS)  -probability of detection 
    - Average detection time 
Krontiris et al. (2007)  -Blackhole  -False Negative (FN) rate 
  -Selective Forwarding  -No. Of false alarms 
Krontiris et al. (2008)  Sinkhole  -FN rate 
    - Neighbors with successful detection 
Stetsko et al. (2010)  -Selective Forwarding  -Relation between FP and FN with a certain 
     value of detection threshold 
  -Jamming 
  -Hello Flood 
Lemos et al. (2010)  -Node repetition  N/A 
Chi and Cho (2006)  -DoS  -FP and FN rates 
    -Energy and detection rate with time 
Moon and Cho (2009)  -Sinkhole  FP and FN ratios 
Ponomarchuk and Seo (2010)  N/A  -Average DR 
 
   However,  this  scheme  has  many  drawbacks  that 
make it unsuitable for the resource constrained WSN. 
The most important drawback is that, each node has to 
perform  its  own  IDS  independently,  so  this  will 
consume  the  nodes’  power  quicker  because  of  the 
clustering  algorithm.  Another  drawback  is  that,  the 
fixed distance threshold of the  fixed  width clustering 
algorithm makes this scheme inflexible.  
 
Detecting  selective  forwarding  attacks  in  WSNs 
using  SVM:  Kaplantzis  et  al.  (2007)  propose  a 
centralized IDS scheme to detect selective forwarding 
and  blackhole  attacks  based  on  one  class  Support 
Vector  Machines  (SVM)  and  sliding  windows.  This 
scheme  uses  only  2D  feature  vector  which  are 
bandwidth and count hope for the classification. This 
scheme  is  totally  centralized  in  such  that  feature 
selection, processing and decision making are all done 
by the base station. 
  The  authors  argue  that  this  scheme  is  energy-
efficient because it is entirely centralized and there is 
no  involvement  of  the  sensor  nodes  in  the  detection 
process.  On  the  other  hand,  the  small  number  of 
features makes this scheme very specific and cannot be 
generalized for different kinds of attacks. Although the 
use  of  Machine  learning  techniques  provides  the 
scheme  with  the  generality  by  training  the  normal 
profile, this scheme only designed to detect two types 
of attacks. That means the choosing of the features is 
very  important  in  making  the  scheme  general  to 
different types of attacks.  
Intrusion  detection  in  wireless  sensor  networks 
based  on  multi-  agent  and  refined  clustering:  A 
multi-agent  intrusion  detection  scheme  proposed  by 
Huai-Bin et al. (2009) to detect attacks in WSN. In this 
scheme  the  mechanism  of  detection  is  different  for 
various  functions:  cluster  heads  are  responsible  for 
monitoring all common member nodes in the cluster, 
while the common member nodes are responsible for 
monitoring  the  header  of  the  cluster.  Four  types  of 
agents are installed on each sensor node to cooperate in 
the  detection.  Each  node  will  execute  different 
operations  of  detection  according  to  its  role  either 
cluster head or common node.  
  Two clustering algorithms are used in this scheme 
in  two  stages.  The  first  stage,  Self  Organizing  Map 
Neural  Network  (SOM)  is  adopted  for  roughly 
clustering. The result of applying this algorithm which 
is the number of clusters and the cluster centers is then 
supplied  for  the  second  stage.  The  second  stage 
involves  the  K-Means  clustering  algorithms  to  refine 
the clusters generated in the first stage. 
  The monitoring of the cluster heads on the nodes 
and  the  monitoring  of  the  nodes  of  cluster  heads 
boost  the  security  process.  However,  the 
communication  overhead  is  increased  by 
communication between the nodes and their cluster 
heads. Another important drawback, is the use of two 
clustering  algorithms  SOM  and  K-Means  which 
cause  a  very  high  computational  overhead  and 
therefore consume the node‘s power in a short time. Am. J. Applied Sci., 9 (10): 1636-1652, 2012 
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Optimized  intrusion  detection  using  Genetic 
Algorithm  (GA):  Khanna  et  al.  (2009)  introduce  a 
scheme to speed up the detection accuracy and reducing 
the false alarms by choosing the appropriate nodes that 
will host the detection agents. Genetic algorithm was 
used  to  evaluate  sensor  node  attributes  and  check  its 
ability  to  be  the  Local  Monitoring  Node  (LMN)  that 
works as a trusted agent for the base station and capable 
of  securely  monitoring  its  neighbors.  Some  node 
attributes are evaluated like packet statistics, utilization 
data, battery status and the quality of service. The node 
fitness is then measured based on these attributes and as 
a result the GA chooses the node that is suitable and 
satisfying all these requirements to be the LMN. 
  The authors argue that, this  scheme is extremely 
appropriate to cooperate with any detection schemes for 
conserving resources usage and cannot be used alone 
for the detection. The main drawback of this scheme is 
the  high  computational  complexity  of  using  GA 
because of the convergence time needed when the scale 
of the WSN is growing up. 
 
Ant-based intrusion detection schemes for wireless 
sensor networks: Muraleedharan and Osadciw (2009), 
Banerjee  et  al.  (2005)  and  Juneja  and  Arora  (2010), 
propose intrusion detection schemes inspired by the ant 
colony algorithm. The idea behind these schemes is the 
use of multiple ant agents in parallel search algorithm 
to deploy pheromone values on nodes. The attacks in 
the network are detected using these pheromone values. 
The  nodes  in  these  models  initially  determine  some 
direct and indirect paths amongst their neighbors. When 
the  ant  detects  any  path,  it  communicates  the 
characteristic of the path through pheromone balancing 
to the other ants. After that, if there is any imbalance in 
pheromone  values,  an  alert  is  raised  to  inform  the 
administrator about a possible attack. 
  The main advantage of such kinds of schemes is 
the  self  organizing  principle  that  is  based  on  the 
probabilistic  behavior.  But,  there  are  some 
drawbacks  for  such  schemes  include  the  high 
communication  overhead  caused  by  the  congestion 
and  the  high  storage  consuming.  The  source  node 
sends  ant  packets  to  all  nodes  through  all  possible 
paths  that  make  congestion  which  result  in  high 
power  consumption.  In  addition,  each  node  has  to 
store  a  very  large  list  of  pheromone  values  which 
utilizes the limited memory of the sensors. 
 
Design and implementation of EAR algorithms for 
detecting  routing  attacks  in  WSN:  Juneja  et  al. 
(2010)  present  an  intrusion  detection  scheme  for 
routing attacks in WSN based on EAR algorithm. It is 
an  extension  to  their  ant  based  scheme  proposed  in 
(Juneja and Arora, 2010). This scheme is based on three 
factors which are the Energy, Age and Reliability of the 
ant. The ants are classified into two main types: forward 
ants  and  backward  ants.  The  forward  ants  report  the 
information of the nodes in the path from the source 
node  to  the  destination  node,  whereas  the  backward 
ants make use of the collected information to update the 
routing tables of nodes on their path and analyze the 
collected information to detect attacks. 
  Every  node  in  the  network  has  a  log  table  that 
contains the information about their remaining energy, 
age of ant, the ratio of sent and delivered packets. The 
job  of  backward  ants  is  to  test  values  related  to  the 
stored values of the  node and compares them  with a 
predefined  threshold  value  to  verify  that  the  path  is 
reliable.  The  authors  claimed  that,  different  types  of 
attacks  that  could  be  identified  using  this  scheme 
include sinkhole, black hole and jamming attacks. It is 
clear that the main drawback of this scheme is the high 
power consumption because of the ant‘s processing in 
two directions at every node in the network. This also 
causes a high communication overhead and congestion. 
The  store  of  the  three  statistics  energy,  age  and 
reliability is not reasonable when the number of sensors 
is very high and the number of ant used is also high. 
 
Self-organized  criticality  and  stochastic  learning 
based intrusion detection system for wireless sensor 
networks:  Doumit  and  Agrawal  (2003)  introduce  a 
Hidden-Markove  Model  (HMM)  based  intrusion 
detection  scheme  for  detecting  possible  attacks  in 
WSN. In this scheme, the normal behavior profile of 
the nodes is first stored in a knowledge base and then 
compared with any suspicious activities of the node to 
handle the inconsistencies. The scheme is based on the 
HMM principle that states that the probability of a node 
being  in  a  certain  state  depends  only  on  its  previous 
state.  Although  this  scheme  offers  the  scalability  of 
adding new nodes, it only tackles the problem from a 
single node ‘view rather than a network ‘view. 
 
An  Integrated  Intrusion  Detection  System  for 
Cluster-based WSNs: Wang et al. (2011) proposed an 
Integrated  Intrusion  Detection  System  (IIDS)  scheme 
for  cluster-based  WSN.  This  scheme  is  composed  of 
three  level  IDS  components  called  Misuse  IDS 
deployed  with  the  common  sensor  nodes,  Hybrid 
Intrusion  Detection  System  (HIDS)  employed  in  the 
cluster heads and Intelligent Hybrid Intrusion Detection 
System  (IHIDS)  employed  in  the  sink  node.  This 
composition of the IDS components is according to the 
different capabilities and probabilities that these entities 
may suffer from. The proposed IIDS consists of both 
misuse  and  anomaly  detection  modules  to  get  the 
benefits of both approaches in increasing the detection 
accuracy and lowering the false alarms. Am. J. Applied Sci., 9 (10): 1636-1652, 2012 
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  The  proposed  IHIDS  contains  an  anomaly 
detection  module,  misuse  detection  module,  learning 
module  and  decision  making  model.  The  anomaly 
detection  module  can  filter  a  large  number  of  traffic 
packets  because  the  sink  node  has  unlimited 
capabilities.  The  normal  output  traffic  from  the 
anomaly  module  is  passed  and  the  abnormal  traffic 
forwarded to the misuse module in order to identify the 
type  of  the  attacks.  If  the  misuse  module  could  not 
identify the type, it is then forwarded to the learning 
module  to  learn  the  new  attack  type.  The  decision 
making module decides the type of attack and reports to 
the administrator.  
  The HIDS part which is employed in the cluster 
heads is similar to the IHIDS except that this part does 
not contain the learning mechanisms due to the limited 
cluster head resources. Instead, it updates their misuse 
knowledge base directly from the learning module in 
IHIDS.  Because  the  resource  of  the  common  sensor 
node  is  very  limited,  it  only  contains  simple  misuse 
detection  that  matches  the  packets  with  the  attack 
model to decide about any occurrence of any attack and 
inform the administrator. 
  The advantage of this scheme is the suitable design 
of the detection modules based on the capabilities and 
the  probabilities  of  getting  compromised.  However, 
there are many drawbacks related to the detail design of 
the  scheme.  The  use  of  Back  Propagation  Neural 
network (BPN) in building the misuse detection module 
implies a high computational complexity to be used in 
common sensor nodes that have very limited resources. 
In addition, the use of KDD’99 dataset to evaluate the 
scheme is not common in evaluating the IDS schemes 
for WSNs because of the different packet format and 
special need of WSN. 
  After  analyzing  the  selected  schemes  above,  the 
advantages  and  shortcoming  of  such  schemes  are 
presented in the following sub-sections. 
 
Advantages of DM/CI based IDS schemes in WSNs: 
 
·  Less  communication  overhead:  since  most  of 
schemes are based on the hierarchical structure of 
the WSN, so there is 
·  Generality is guaranteed: since the normal profile 
is not based on specific traffic features 
·  Scalability is also guaranteed: because the normal 
profile  depends  on  the  data  and  not  on  the 
architecture 
Shortcomings  of  DM/CI  based  IDS  schemes  in 
WSNs: 
 
·  Slow detection: because the data mining techniques 
like clustering require learning the normal profile, 
they are slow and therefore are not satisfying the 
streaming feature of the WSN that requires a fast 
solution or real time solution 
·  High  computational  complexity:  because  they 
involve the use of some complex machine learning 
algorithms or some difficult clustering approaches 
·  High false alarms: because they build the normal 
profile for a data in a specific point of time and 
there is no quick update, the normal profile could 
be out of data 
 
  The following Table 3 summarizes the mentioned 
schemes and shows their shortcomings. 
 
Game theory based intrusion detection schemes in 
WSN:  The  essence  of  the  interaction  between  the 
intrusion  detection  agent  and  the  attacker  can  be 
represented  scientifically  by  a  game  between  two 
players. In these games, different strategies can be used 
by  the  intrusion  detection  agent  in  order  to  defend 
against the different strategies that attackers always use. 
In the following, some game theoretical based intrusion 
detection schemes in WSN are presented. 
 
Detecting network intrusions via sampling: a game 
theoretic  approach:  Murali  and  Lakshman  (2003) 
introduced  a  game  theoretic  framework  for  effective 
detection of network intrusions by developing a network 
packet sampling strategy. In this framework, the intruder 
will  choose  the  paths  that  minimize  the  chances  of 
detection  while  packet  sampling  strategy  is  used  to 
maximize  the  chances  of  detection  by  the  network 
operator. The game theoretic problem is first formulated 
and then the sampling schemes are developed so that to 
be optimal with the game approaches without exceeding 
a given total sampling budget. 
  This  framework  is  among  the  first  attempts  to 
tackle  the  problem  of  intrusion  detection  using  the 
game theory. The idea behind choosing the paths either 
from the intruder or the network operator leads to the 
common  routing  issues  specifically  in  the  routing 
protocols  that  are  based  on  the  shortest  path  to 
determine its way to the base station. This advantage 
would make this framework suitable for detecting some 
kinds of attacks in the routing layer that are based on 
the routing path information. However, this framework 
still needs extensive simulation experiments to prove its 
viability and effectiveness to detect attacks. Am. J. Applied Sci., 9 (10): 1636-1652, 2012 
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Table 3: summary of DM/CI based intrusion detection schemes in WSN 
Scheme  DM/CI technique used  Shortcomings  
Loo et al. (2006)  Fixed width clustering   High computational complexity because of the use of IDS agents in each node 
Kaplantzis et al. (2007)  Support Vector Machines (SVM)  Centralized solution cause high communication overhead 
Huai-bin et al. (2009)  Clustering/ SOM +K-Means  Very high computational complexity 
Khanna et al. (2009)  Genetic Algorithms (GA)  High computational complexity needed for convergence 
Muraleedharan and Osadciw (2009)  Ant Colony   High communication overhead 
Juneja et al. (2010)  Ant Colony  High computational complexity high communication overhead 
Doumit and Agrawal (2003)  Hidden Markove Model (HMM)  Nodes’ level processing rather than network view 
Wang et al. (2011)  Back Propagation NN (BPNN)  High computational complexity of BPNN to be use in misuse detection in common sensors 
  Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART)   
 
Intrusion  detection  in  sensor  network:  a  non 
cooperative  game  approach:  Agah  et  al.  (2004) 
proposed  a  non-cooperative  game  framework  for  the 
defense  of  nodes  in  WSN.  In  this  framework,  three 
different schemes have been applied to finding the most 
vulnerable  node  in  WSN  and  protect  it.  The  first 
scheme,  an  attack-defense  problem  is  approached  as 
two players, non zero, non-cooperative game between 
the attacker and the sensor network. The second scheme 
uses the Markov Decision Process (MDP) to find the 
most vulnerable sensor node whereas the third scheme 
applies node’s traffic as an intuitive metric to use it as 
an  indicator  for  protecting  the  node.  The  authors 
claimed that the evaluation of their schemes reveals its 
effectiveness of successful defense against attacks. 
  This study needs an experimental investigation to 
prove the concepts of the three used schemes. Another 
limitation of this work is that, the strategy on when the 
MDP should be applied and when the theoretic game 
framework  should  be  used  to  gain  high  success 
detection is not determined. 
 
Detection  of  denial-of-message  attacks  on  sensor 
network broadcasts: A detection scheme of Denial of 
Message  (DoM)  attacks  in  WSN  is  introduced  by 
McCune et al. (2005). This scheme is designed for the 
broadcasting  protocols  in  which  the  messages  are 
broadcasted to the  nodes periodically. The scheme is 
based  on  the  Secure  Implicit  Sampling  (SIS)  method 
that enables the broadcasting base station to detect the 
failure  of  nodes  to  receive  its  broadcast  in  a 
probabilistic manner. The idea behind the SIS is that 
it  works  by  extracting  the  authenticated 
acknowledgments from an unpredictable and tunable 
subset of nodes per broadcast so that it will minimize 
the acknowledgment implosion on the base station. 
The game theoretic approach here is used to evaluate 
the SIS method in facing optimal attackers that try to 
maximize  the  number  of  nodes  denying  the 
broadcasting of network messages. 
  Although  this  scheme  is  opening  the  door  for 
research  in  this  important  area  and  as  shown  in  the 
study agrees well with the simulation scenarios, it has 
many  limitations.  The  assumption  that  the  nodes  are 
always stable and immobile adds unrealistic constraints 
to the application of sensor networks for some critical 
environments.  Another  unrealistic  assumption  is  that 
the node does not fail over time and this is not always 
true since there are many other reasons that may cause 
the failure of a node at any time. 
 
An  intrusion  detection  game  with  limited 
observations:  Alpcan  and  Basar  (2006)  presented  an 
intrusion detection game model based on the 2-player 
zero  sum  stochastic  (Markov)  approach.  The  model 
represents  the  interaction  between  two  players  which 
are the potential malicious attacker from one side and 
the IDS from the other. The observations of the sensors 
are captured and reported to the IDS as a finite state 
Markov chain. In this model, a numerical analyze has 
been used to study the optimal strategic solutions as 
well as the evolution of player‘s cost under the game 
parameters. The model also considers the case that 
the players optimize their strategies with the lack of 
information  about  the  WSN  characteristics  by 
involving the Markov Decision Process (MDP) and 
Q-learning methods. 
  The main advantage of this model is the use of the 
dynamic  learning  methods  with  the  lack  of 
information.  This  feature  enables  the  players  to 
consider the future costs for optimizing their strategies 
by the continuous learning about the potential attacks. 
However  this  model  needs  to  be  evaluated  by 
simulation  experiments  in  order  to  validate  the 
effectiveness of the Markov based IDS rather than the 
numerical analysis used in the evaluation. 
 
Game theory model for selective forward attacks in 
WSN:  A  framework  using  Zero-Sum  game  approach 
and  selective  node  acknowledgements  in  the  forward 
data path is proposed by Reddy and Srivathsan (2009) to 
detect selective forwarding attacks in WSN. The authors 
provide  mathematical  foundations  for  detecting 
malicious nodes using selected points in the forward data 
path. They proved that selective acknowledgements are 
very  useful  to  detect  the  malicious  nodes  through 
simulations.  However,  like  other  game  theoretical 
approaches, this framework need to be more investigated 
experimentally to prove its concept. Am. J. Applied Sci., 9 (10): 1636-1652, 2012 
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  Advantages of game theory based IDS schemes in 
WSN: 
 
·  The  game  theoretical  based  IDS  schemes  do  not 
need  extra  data  to  build  the  model  and  rather 
benefits  from  the  routing  information  of  the 
network 
·  The techniques used in these kinds of schemes are 
lightweight  since  no training is involved and are 
depending on some strategies 
  Shortcomings of game theory based IDS schemes 
in WS: 
 
·  It is obvious from the reviewed schemes that these 
schemes still concepts that need to be experimented 
extensively to prove their viability 
·  The scope of the game theoretical based schemes is 
limited to some layers information like the routing 
and application layers information because it builds 
the strategies based on some information from the 
network layer and application layers 
 
Statistical  based  intrusion  detection  schemes  in 
WSN: The use of statistical techniques is common for 
anomaly detection schemes designed for WSN. These 
schemes  use  the  probability  distribution  of  either  the 
normal  or  abnormal  data  as  an  evidence  of  attack 
behavior.  The  probability  distribution  model  is  first 
built and then compared to any deviation of data traffic 
generated  later  by  the  network.  The  following  sub-
sections  describe  some  key  statistical  based  intrusion 
detection schemes used in WSN. 
 
An  anomaly  detection  algorithm  for  detecting 
attacks  in  wireless  sensor  networks:  Phuong  et  al. 
(2006) present a new scheme based on the Cumulative 
Sum algorithm (CuSum) for detecting different kinds of 
attacks in WSN. This algorithm is one of the change 
point detection algorithm used to detect the change of 
the mean value of random sequence. In this scheme, the 
CuSum algorithm is employed to detect the changes in 
the number of incoming and outgoing packets as well 
as the number of collisions. A set of monitoring nodes 
is selected so that each sensor node is monitored by at 
least one monitor node.  
  This  scheme‘s  main  drawback  is  that  the  monitor 
node can be a point of failure easily since it is a normal 
sensor  node.  In  addition,  the  implementation  of  such 
algorithm in a normal monitor node is power consuming. 
 
Group-based intrusion detection system in wireless 
sensor network: Li et al. (2008) propose a scheme in 
which,  the  sensor  network  is  partitioned  into  many 
groups  using  delta-grouping  algorithm.  In  this 
algorithm,  each  group  of  sensors  that  are  physically 
close  to  each  other  and  has  nearly  the  same  sensing 
capabilities are grouped together. Some monitor nodes 
are chosen to monitor each group alternatively. After 
that  a  statistical  distribution-based  anomaly  detection 
algorithm  is  used  to  detect  the  anomalies  caused  by 
attacks. According to the authors, this scheme takes into 
consideration multiple attributes of the sensor nodes in 
order to increase the accuracy of the detection. 
  The  high  computational  complexity  of  the 
grouping  algorithm  and  the  statistical  distribution 
algorithm is the main drawback since the common sensor 
node has limited resources. In addition, the monitoring 
node  becomes  a  point  of  failure  if  compromised. 
However,  this  scheme  has  many  advantages  including 
the  detection  generality  because  of  the  use  of  several 
typical traffic features over the network. 
 
Statistical wormhole detection in WSN: Buttyán et al. 
(2005)  proposed  two  mechanisms  which  are  the 
Neighbor  Number  Test  (NNT)  and  the  All  Distances 
Test (ADT) for detecting wormhole attacks in WSN. In 
the first mechanism NNT, the increase of the number of 
neighbors of the sensor is used as an indicator that new 
links have been created by the wormhole attack. The 
second mechanism, ADT, the decrease of the lengths of 
the paths between the nodes is used as an indicator to 
the shortcut links created by the wormhole attacks. It is 
assumed  that  the  sensor  nodes  send  their  neighbors 
information to the base station where the algorithm is 
applied  on  the  reconstructed  network  graph  by  the 
received information. 
  Both  mechanisms  have  been  investigated  by 
simulation  and  showed  that  they  are  effective  in 
detecting wormhole attack with some limitations related 
to  the  radius  of  the  area  that  is  affected  by  the 
wormhole. The authors reported that high accuracy is 
achieved when the wormhole radius is comparable to 
the  radius  of  the  sensor  radio  range.  However,  these 
mechanisms only detect the presence of the wormhole 
attack but they do not provide any mean for localization 
of the affected area. Another drawback is related to the 
sending of neighbors’ information to the base stations 
by  the  sensor  nodes  and  results  in  intensive 
communication overhead and consumes the power of 
the nodes on the way to the base station. 
 
Malicious  node  detection  in  WSN  using  an  Auto 
regression  technique:  A  strategy  based  on  the 
past/present  values  generated  by  sensor  nodes  is 
presented  by  Curiac  et  al.  (2007).  In  this  study,  the 
output  of  each  sensor  at  each  moment  with  its Am. J. Applied Sci., 9 (10): 1636-1652, 2012 
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estimated value is computed to a predictor based on 
Auto  Regression  (AR)  technique.  If  there  is  a  big 
difference between the two values in any sensor then 
this sensor becomes suspicious and an action should 
be done to mitigate its effects. The authors presented 
a  case  study  to  prove  the  effectiveness  of  their 
concept with some assumptions that are set prior the 
design of the AR technique. These assumptions are 
common  in  other  intrusion  detection  schemes  for 
WSN but limit the applications of these schemes for 
different WSN applications. 
 
Advantages  of  statistical  based  IDS  schemes  in 
WSN: The statistical based schemes are mathematically 
proven and can be used effectively only if the accurate 
probability distribution model for normal or abnormal 
traffic is obtained. 
 
  Shortcomings of statistical based IDS schemes in 
WSN: 
 
·  Usually  the  process  of  acquiring  the  correct 
probability distribution is not easy especially when 
no  prior  knowledge  is  available  about  sensor 
streaming data 
·  Many of statistical schemes do not fit well with the 
multivariate data 
·  The dynamic streaming of network data makes it 
difficult to keep the probability distribution model 
up to date 
 
Important future research areas: In order to satisfy 
the requirements of an ideal intrusion detection scheme, 
some important research opportunities open for further 
research: 
 
·  Detection generality: to design intrusion detection 
schemes that can be used to detect different types 
of attacks 
·  Detection speed: there is a need for a fast intrusion 
detection  scheme  that  satisfy  the  dynamic  and 
continuous streaming of data in WSNs 
·  The  use  of  the  lightweight  Artificial  Intelligence 
techniques: since these techniques have been used 
successfully  for  intrusion  detection  in  traditional 
networks, it is expected that the use of them here 
would  enhance  the  anomaly  intrusion  detection 
accuracy and generality 
·  The  use  of  optimization  techniques:  these 
techniques  could  cooperate  together  with  other 
techniques  for  choosing  the  best  strategies  of 
detection and the placement of detection agents 
·  The  integration  between  techniques  from  different 
categories: as proved their success in other domains, it 
would be interesting to try such integration. i.e., the 
rule-based  and  the  DM/CI  based  schemes  can  be 
integrated together in such strategy of game theory to 
get the advantages of all of them 
·  Reducing  the  false  alarm  rates  related  to  the 
DM/CI: since these schemes depend on the labelled 
data  collected  from  the  network,  there  is  a  high 
false alarm related to the application of them. It is 
interesting  to  look  for  solutions  to  mitigate  this 
problem for the context of WSN 
·  Distribution  of  the  intrusion  detection:  because 
there  is  no  single  point  in  WSN  can  be  used  to 
install the IDS agent and because the log data is 
collected in each sensor node, there is a need for a 
real distributed intrusion detection scheme that can 
also minimize the power consumption results from 
the communication overhead with the base station 
in case of centralized IDS installation 
·  Unsupervised anomaly intrusion detection: in fact, 
there is no labelled data set available for intrusion 
detection in WSN. In addition, the design of such 
data set is  not easy and costly task. It  would be 
interesting  to  focus  on  the  techniques,  especially 
artificial  intelligence  and  data  mining  techniques 
that do not require prior knowledge 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
  As the WSN becomes necessary and used frequently 
for many applications, the need for securing them is also 
increasing due to the nature of their deployment and their 
resource  restrictions.  Cryptographic  and  authentication 
protocols have been proposed to protect these networks 
from outsider intrusions but fail to protect them from the 
insider  ones.  Many  surveys  have  been  published  for 
anomaly  detection  but  according  to  the  best  of  our 
knowledge none of them tackle the problem of intrusion 
detection in specific. Instead, most of them focus on the 
anomaly detection in general assuming that the intrusion 
is kind of anomalies. In this article, we surveyed about 
the intrusion detection schemes in WSN. First, we state 
the  fundamental  issues  of  intrusion  detection  in  WSN 
showing the types of attacks, the motivation and the need 
for the intrusion detection in WSN and the taxonomy of 
techniques  used  in  the  literature.  After  that,  the 
challenges  faced  in  developing  an  ideal  intrusion 
detection  scheme  were  explored  followed  by  the 
requirements  for  a  good  candidate  intrusion  detection 
scheme.  The  classification  of  the-state-of-the-art 
intrusion detection schemes proposed for WSN is then 
presented based on the technique used by each scheme. Am. J. Applied Sci., 9 (10): 1636-1652, 2012 
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The  classification  includes  four  main  categories:  rule 
based, data mining and computational intelligence based, 
game  theoretical  based  and  statistical  based.  For  each 
category,  an  analysis  has  been  carried  out  for  each 
scheme  highlighting  their  advantages  and  drawbacks. 
Finally, some important future research opportunities are 
pointed out for the future research. 
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